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Resum 
 
El propòsit d'aquest article és introduir una mercat de treball no competitiu i atur en el model 
de  creixement  amb  taxes  d'estalvi  exògenes  que  es  pot  trobar  en  els  llibres  de  text  de 
creixement (Sala‐i‐Martín, 2000; Barro and Sala‐i‐Martín, 2003; Romer, 2006). Primer, derivem 
un  marc  general  amb  una  funció  de  producció  neoclàssica  per  analitzar  la  relació  entre 
creixement  i  ocupació.  Utilitzem  aquest  marc  per  estudiar  les  dinàmiques  conjuntes  del 
creixement i l'ocupació sota diferents regles de fixació salarial. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a non‐competitive labor market and unemployment 
into  the  growth models with  exogenous  saving  rates  found  in  economic  growth  textbooks 
(Sala‐i‐Martín, 2000; Barro and Sala‐i‐Martín, 2003; Romer, 2006). We  first derive a general 
framework with a neoclassical production function to analyze the relationship between growth 
and  employment.  We  use  this  framework  to  study  the  joint  dynamics  of  growth  and 
employment when different wage setting rules are considered. 
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1. Introduction
Most textbooks when dealing with economic growth assume full-employment, with the obvious
implication that the relationship between employment and growth cannot be analyzed. The
purpose of this paper is primary pedagogical as it seeks to extend growth models with exogenous
saving rates and a competitive labor market, found largely in advanced growth textbooks (Sala-
i-Martín, 2000; Barro and Sala-i-Martín, 2003; Romer, 2007), to the case of non-competitive
labor markets. In these models, the equilibrium exhibits unemployment and, thus, we can
study the relationship between growth and employment both in the short and in the long run.
Aricó (2003) classies models of growth and unemployment according to how unemploy-
ment is generated. On the one hand, we have models with non-frictional unemployment, where
unemployment occurs because the wage set by some economic agent causes excess supply in a
labor market without friction. This economic agent may be the unions and, so, we have the
monopoly union model (McDonald and Solow 1981), or it may be the rms and, so, we have
the e¢ ciency wage model (Solow 1979). On the other hand, we have models with frictional
unemployment (Pissarides 1990) where, in addition to wage setting, frictions arise in the labor
market due to matching problems. In these models, it is the unemployment rate that equi-
librates ows in and out of the labor market. The models with non-frictional unemployment
can also be referred to as models with disequilibrium unemployment because labor demand is
lower than labor supply, whereas the models with frictional unemployment can be referred to
as models with equilibrium unemployment because the unemployment rate specically equili-
brates ows in and out of the labor market. In this paper, we present models without frictions
because it is the simplest framework to illustrate the e¤ects of wage setting on employment,
capital accumulation and growth. Moreover, this framework allows a direct comparison with
the growth models with full-employment that can be found in the aforementioned textbooks.
For teaching and educational purposes, we assume an exogenous and constant saving rate.
As is well-known, the growth model with a constant saving rate, neoclassical production func-
tion and full-employment is the Solow model. Therefore, in this paper we extend the Solow
model by introducing unemployment. We rst present a general framework that illustrates
with a neoclassical production function the relationship between growth and employment and
its dependence on wages. Having presented this general framework, in Section 3 we analyze
the joint dynamics of growth and employment when three di¤erent wage setting rules are con-
sidered. These rules are di¤erentiated by the intensity of wage inertia (persistence). We show
that if wages are completely rigid, which is an extreme case of inertia, then the growth of
capital is constant, whereas the employment rate either grows or falls depending on the wage
level. In contrast, if wages are exible (i.e., there is a complete absence of inertia), then the
employment rate is constant and a¤ects the economic growth rate. We show that, in this case,
scal policy and labor market imperfections that reduce the employment rate imply a lower
growth rate during the transition and a smaller long-run per capita income. After studying
these two extreme wage settings, we assume that wages exhibit inertia and we study the time
paths of both capital and employment. In this case, we show how the initial value of wages
a¤ects the joint dynamics of employment and growth. In particular, by using a simple phase
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diagram, we show that two economies with the same initial capital stock and di¤erent initial
wages at rst exhibit opposite time paths of growth and employment: employment increases
and capital accumulates in the economy with low wages initially, whereas both employment
and capital decrease in the economy with high wages initially.
From a comparison of these three cases, we conclude that the intensity of wage inertia
determines the time path of both employment and growth and that it also drives the short-
and long-run e¤ects on economic variables of technological and scal policy shocks. We also
conclude that cross-country di¤erences in the dynamics of employment and growth can be
explained as the result of cross-country di¤erences in labor market imperfections that imply
di¤erences in either the intensity of wage inertia or the initial level of wages.
2. Model
In this section, we describe the general framework. We rst introduce the neoclassical produc-
tion function and then we characterize the accumulation of capital. In this general analysis,
we assume that rms are price takers and that there is no technological progress. However,
this analysis could easily be extended to consider imperfect product markets or exogenous
technological progress.
2.1. Firms
We assume the following neoclassical production function:
Yt = F (Kt; Lt),
with constant returns to scale, FK > 0, FL > 0, FKK < 0, and FLL < 0. The production
function in intensive form is
y^t = f(k^t),
where y^t = Yt=Lt is the output per worker, k^t = Kt=Lt is the capital per worker and the
production function satises f 0 > 0 and f< 0. We assume a price taking rm that maximizes
prots
F (Kt; Lt)  wtLt   (rt + )Kt,
where wt is the real wage, rt is the interest rate and  2 (0; 1) is the constant depreciation rate.
The rst order conditions are
wt = FL(Kt; Lt),
and
rt +  = FK(Kt; Lt),
which can be rewritten in intensive form as
wt = f(k^t)  k^tf 0(k^t), (2.1)
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and
rt +  = f
0(k^t). (2.2)
We assume that the labor supply is equal to population, Nt, and that it grows at the
constant growth rate n. In the models with growth and unemployment, we also rewrite the
production function in terms of output per capita yt = Yt=Nt, capital per capita kt = Kt=Nt
and the employment rate lt = Lt=Nt. As we assume constant returns to scale, we can rewrite
the production function as
Yt
Nt
= F

Kt
Nt
;
Lt
Nt

= F (kt; lt).
The analysis conducted so far is identical to that conducted in any textbook introducing
the neoclassical growth model except that, because of unemployment, we distinguish between
per-capita and per-worker variables. As mentioned in the introduction, unemployment is a
consequence of wages that are set above the Walrasian wage. Therefore, in the remainder of
this section, in order to clarify the role of wages to students, we show that the main model
variables can be rewritten as functions of wages. First, we use (2.1) to obtain that capital per
worker depends on wages according to the following function:
k^t = ~k(wt), (2.3)
where ~k0 > 0. It is interesting to note that this derivative implies that the higher the wage,
the higher is the capital per worker ratio demanded by the rm. The student obtains this
property applying the implicit function theorem, where the assumption that f 00(k^t) < 0 is
fundamental. This assumption implies, in fact, that there are many techniques of production
available and, then, as the wage increases rms use a more capital intensive technique. It is
important to explain to students that the substitution between capital and labor drives the
relationship between growth and employment. Indeed, it is straightforward to show that this
relationship disappears when the production function has constant coe¢ cients (the Leontief
production function) and substitution between inputs is not possible.
Next, by combining (2.2) and (2.3), we obtain the interest rate
rt = ~r(wt) = f
0(~k(wt))  ; (2.4)
where ~r0 < 0, implying that if the wage increases, the interest rate must decrease in order to
have zero prots. Of course, if the interest rate is higher than the rate given by this function,
we have negative prots and the capital and labor demands are zero. If it is lower, we have
positive prots and the capital and labor demands are innite.
It is also interesting to show how the product per unit of capital depends on the wage, as
this ratio will be key in the growth equation. By combining the denition of product per worker
and (2.3), we obtain the following relations:
Yt
Kt
=
yt
kt
=
F (kt; lt)
kt
:
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Using the constant returns to scale assumption, we can rewrite the previous relations as follows
Yt
Kt
= F

1;
lt
kt

= ~f

1
k^t

= ~f

1
~k(wt)

= h(wt); (2.5)
where h0 < 0: Thus, a higher wage lowers output per unit of capital. Obviously, this is a
consequence of the fact that higher wages reduce employment and in turn reduce the amount
of output that can be produced with one unit of capital.
From (2.3) and the denition of capital per worker, we obtain the labor demand function
Ldt =
~L(wt; Kt) =
Kt
~k(wt)
, (2.6)
where ~L! < 0 and ~LKd > 0: In wage setting models there is no equilibrium in all markets
if the wage is di¤erent from the Walrasian wage. Either there is an excess supply of labor
(unemployment) or there is an excess supply of capital. In this paper, we assume that the wage
is larger than the Walrasian wage and that there is unemployment. In this case, the amount
of employment is constrained by the labor demand and thus
Lt = L
d
t =
~L(wt; Kt) =
Kt
~k(wt)
. (2.7)
Using (2.7) and dividing by Nt, we obtain the employment rate
lt =
kt
~k(wt)
. (2.8)
Note that the employment rate depends positively on the stock of capital and negatively on
the wage. We interpret the rst relationship saying that employment depends on growth.
Karanassou et al. (2008) provide empirical support for this positive relationship between capital
and employment. The negative relationship between employment and wages is a consequence
of rms substituting labor with capital when wages increase.
2.2. Families and Equilibrium in the Capital Market
We assume that families save a constant fraction s 2 (0; 1) of their total income. In this
stylized economy without government or external sectors, savings are totally devoted to gross
investment, It. Thus,
It = sF (Kt; Lt)
and gross investment is devoted to the accumulation of new capital and to compensating the
depreciation of the existing stock.1 Therefore, It = _Kt + Kt and
_Kt = sF (Kt; Lt)  Kt:
1As there is unemployment, it may be that some members of the family are unemployed and receive un-
employment benets. In this case, total income does not change if the government has a balanced budget
constraint.
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In per capita terms, we obtain that the accumulation of capital per capita satises
_kt = sF (kt; lt)  ( + n) kt: (2.9)
This equation shows that an increase in the employment rate increases the accumulation of
capital per capita. Indeed, the di¤erence between this equation and the fundamental equation
with a competitive labor market and full employment (i.e., the Solow model) is the employment
rate. Dividing by kt; we obtain the growth rate of capital per capita
k 
_kt
kt
=
sF (kt; lt)
kt
  (n+ ). (2.10)
Using (2.5), the growth rate of capital per capita is obtained as a function of wages
k = sh(wt)  (n+ ). (2.11)
As follows from this equation, an increase in the wage reduces the growth rate of capital per
capita because it decreases output per unit of capital.
3. Joint Dynamics of Growth and Employment
In the previous section we have shown that the accumulation of capital is obtained from equation
(2.11) and that the time path of employment is determined by equation (2.8). These two
equations depend on the time path of wages. As follows from these two equations, an increase in
wages reduces both the employment rate and the accumulation of capital, implying a reduction
in the GDP growth rate. Therefore, in order to close the model, we need to introduce a wage
equation that determines the time path of wages. In what follows, we study the joint dynamics
of growth and employment when three di¤erent wage setting rules are considered. These wage
setting rules are di¤erentiated by the dependence of current wages on past wages, known as
wage inertia. In Subsection 3.1, we assume that wages are completely rigid implying that they
are identical to past wages. In Subsection 3.2, we consider that wages are exible, meaning
that they do not depend on the past. Finally, in the last section, we make an intermediate
assumption and we consider that wages exhibit inertia, which implies that the change in wages
depends on the value of past wages. By comparing between these three subsections, we conclude
that the dynamics of growth and employment crucially depend on the intensity of wage inertia.
3.1. Rigid Real Wages. A Constant Growth Rate of Capital
We rst assume that current wages are identical to past wages and, therefore, they are constant.2
Let wt = w be this constant wage.3 With a constant real wage, the growth rate of capital per
2This case is interesting because having a constant real wage is frequently recommended by governments,
central banks and other economic institutions to ensure stability.
3Benassy (1997) presents a model that generates a constant real wage.
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capita is constant as follows from (2.11):
k = sh(w)  (n+ ).
Note that a larger real wage implies a lower growth rate. In order to understand the dynamics
implied by this equation, suppose that that there exists a w such that k = 0 . If w < w
;
then k > 0 and the employment rate increases until full-employment is achieved. If w > w
;
then k < 0 and the employment rate decreases until zero. We conclude that in this case there
is a long-run relationship between growth and employment in the sense that a positive growth
rate implies full-employment in the long run.
3.2. Flexible Wages. A Constant Employment Rate
In this section, we study the time path of growth and employment when the wage is exible in
the sense that it does not depend on the past. In this case, an increase in labor productivity (due
to either capital accumulation or technological progress) translates fully into wage increases and,
thus, employment is not a¤ected. This implies that the employment rate is constant throughout
the transition. This constant employment rate is denoted as structural employment because it
is independent of both capital and technology. The class of wage equations implying a constant
employment rate requires a linear relationship between the wage and a reservation (reference)
wage or alternative income; i.e.
wt = mwzt; (3.1)
where mw 2 (0; 1) is the constant wage mark-up and zt is the reservation wage or alternative
income. In Appendix A, we obtain this equation from static wage setting models.4
We assume that the reservation wage is the unemployment benet and that it is nanced
with a constant tax rate,  , on the wage income of employed workers. In this case, the reser-
vation wage is
zt =
wtLt
Nt   Lt .
Combining both equations, we obtain
wt = mw
wtLt
Nt   Lt ,
and, by using the denition of the employment rate, we obtain the following constant employ-
ment rate
lt = l
 =
1
1 + mw
.
Note that l  1 if   0. Note also that the employment rate is constant throughout the
4Obtaining the wage equation from dynamic models with growth is more di¢ cult because the wage now
a¤ects capital accumulation via equation (2.11) and, then, future employment. To avoid this problem in models
with unions we have to assume that for some reason "the union does not internalize the dynamic consequences
of setting the wage over capital accumulation and future employment" (Ma¤ezzoli, 2001 p.869). This may occur
if the union only cares about present employment or if it is su¢ ciently small for thinking that modifying the
wage will a¤ect aggregate income, aggregate savings, the aggregate stock of capital and then future employment.
Galí (1996) and Van der Ploeg (1987) present models when these dynamic consequences are taken into account.
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transition and decreases with the tax rate and the value of the parameter mw: In Appendix
A, we show that this parameter depends on either the elasticity of the labor demand, income
taxes, the bargaining power of unions or the degree of market power. Thus, an increase in either
the income tax rate or the other parameters characterizing the degree of imperfection in the
labor market causes a reduction in this constant employment rate. In contrast, this structural
employment rate does not depend on the stock of capital nor on the technology. As mentioned,
this is a consequence of the fact that any increase in labor productivity causes a larger wage
that completely crowds out any positive e¤ect on employment.5
When the employment rate is constant, the dynamics of the model with unemployment is
similar to the dynamics of the model with full employment. To see this, we divide (2.9) by kt
to obtain
_kt
kt
=
sF (kt; l
)
kt
  (n+ ). (3.2)
Figure 1 illustrates the transitional dynamics implied by this di¤erential equation by com-
paring the transitional dynamics of two economies that are di¤erentiated only by the employ-
ment rate: economy A exhibits full employment, while economy B exhibits unemployment.
From the analysis of this gure, we obtain the following results. First, regardless of the value
of the employment rate, there is global convergence to the unique steady state, as in the Solow
model with full-employment. Second, the growth rate of capital per capita is lower for a given
level of kt in a model with unemployment. This implies that employment a¤ects growth. The
gure illustrates this by comparing economies A and B. Both economies have the same initial
capital stock but a di¤erent growth rate. In economy A, because of full-employment, the growth
rate is initially positive and capital increases until it converges to the steady state. In economy
B, the growth rate is negative, implying that capital decreases until it converges to the steady
state. Note that the di¤erences in the employment rate imply di¤erences in the growth rate
throughout the transition and in the long-run levels of per capita capital. Thus, the long-run
per capita capital stock and, hence, the long-run per capita income are smaller when there
is unemployment. Therefore, this model implies a long-run relationship between employment
and the long-run levels of capital and income per capita. Finally, increases in income taxes
or changes in labor market regulations that reduce the employment rate will reduce both the
economic growth rate during the transition and the long-run level of per capita income.
3.3. Wage Setting Rules with Inertia
Empirical evidence shows that current real wages change depending on the value of past real
wages (see Blanchard and Katz, 1997 and 1999; and Hogan, 2004). This is known as wage
persistence or wage inertia. In this section, we analyze the consequences of wage inertia on both
employment and growth. As in the previous subsection, we assume that the wage equation is
wt = mwzt, where zt is the reservation wage. We introduce wage inertia by assuming that the
5Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), Pissarides (1990) and Raurich, Sala and Sorolla (2006) assume that
the reservation wage is the average labor income. In this case, the employment rate is also constant.
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reservation wage is a weighted average of the actual unemployment benet and past wages, i.e.
zt = wt 1 + (1  )bt;
where  2 [0; 1] and bt is the unemployment benet.6 Combining with the wage equation, we
obtain
wt = mw(wt 1 + (1  )bt).
On the one hand, if  = 1 and mw = 1 then wt = wt 1 implying that wages are rigid as in
Subsection 3.1. On the other hand, if  = 0 then wt = mwbt; which coincides with the wage
equation in Subsection 3.2. Therefore, the parameter  provides a measure of wage inertia: the
larger  is, the more rigid wages become. Thus, the wage equation in this subsection generalizes
both situations, allowing us to characterize the relationship between employment and growth
when wages exhibit inertia.
We also assume that the unemployment benet is nanced with a tax on wage income
implying that
bt =
wtLt
Nt   Lt =
wtlt
1  lt .
Therefore, we obtain
wt = mwwt 1 + (1  )mw wtlt
1  lt ; (3.3)
which can be rewritten as the following di¤erential equation:
wt   wt 1
wt 1
' _wt
wt
=
(mw   1) (1  lt) + (1  )mw lt
1  lt   (1  )mw lt : (3.4)
It is straightforward to show from this equation that wages grow faster when the employment
rate is higher and that they decrease (increase) when the employment rate is below (above)
its long run value. This equation together with the law of motion of capital per capita, (2.11),
and the employment rate, lt = kt=~k(wt); determine the joint dynamics of capital, wages and
employment. We proceed to characterize this joint dynamics.
We rst obtain the long-run equilibrium or steady state. From (3.4) and assuming that
_wt = 0; we obtain that the steady state value of the employment rate is
l =
1  mw
1  mw + (1  )mw :
From (2.11) and assuming that _kt = 0; we obtain that the steady state value of the wages
satises
h(w) =
n+ 
s
:
6Blanchard and Katz (1997) justify wage inertia in the reservation wage by claiming that "models based on
fairness suggest that the reservation wage may depend on factors such as the level and the rate of growth of
wages in the past, if workers have come to consider such wage increases as fair. Perhaps a better word than
reservation wage in that context is an aspiration wage (p.54)". Collard and de la Croix (2000), de la Croix et
al., (2000) Danthine and Kurmann (2004) and Raurich and Sorolla (2011) introduce wage inertia in an e¢ ciency
wage model where workersdisutility depends on the comparison between current and past wages.
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Finally, the steady state value of capital is k = l~k(w):
Note that if  = 0 and there is no wage inertia then l = 1= (1 + mw) ; as in Subsection
3.2. In contrast, when  = 1 wages are rigid and l = 1; as in Subsection 3.1. Note also that
an increase in the savings rate increases wages and capital, but does not a¤ect the long-run
employment rate. In contrast, an increase in either labor market imperfections, mw; or the tax
rate,  ; decreases both the long-run employment rate and the long-run capital stock, but does
not a¤ect the long-run level of wages.
The transitional dynamics are obtained from using (2.11) and (3.4) and they are illustrated
in the phase diagram in Figure 2. This gure shows that the steady state is stable.7 Given
that both capital and wages are state variables, this means that, given the initial values of both
capital and wages, there is a unique equilibrium that converges to the steady state.8 As shown
in this gure, two economies with the same initial capital stock and di¤erent initial wages
will exhibit very di¤erent transitional dynamics. Economy A, with initially high wages and
high capital stock, will monotonically reduce both capital, wages and employment during the
transition until convergence. In contrast, economy B, with initially low wages and high capital
stock will at rst increase both capital, wages and employment. After these initial periods,
capital decreases while wages continue to increase. Eventually, capital, wages and employment
decrease until they converge. Note that these two economies with the same initial capital stock
will exhibit di¤erent transitional dynamics due to di¤erent initial wages. Thus, the time path
of the variables throughout the transition depends on the initial values of both capital and
wages.
4. Conclusions
We have derived the general structure of growth models with exogenous and constant saving
rates and a non-competitive labor market. We have used this general structure to study the
relationship between growth and employment and we have shown that this relationship de-
pends on the intensity of wage inertia. When wages are rigid, the accumulation of capital is
constant and determined by these rigid wages. In this case, employment either converges to
full-employment or diverges to zero employment. When wages are exible, employment is con-
stant and does not depend on growth. In contrast, capital and income exhibit a non-constant
time path that converges to a steady state. We show that larger labor market imperfections or
larger income tax rates that reduce the employment rate cause a smaller growth rate during the
transition and a smaller per capita income in the long-run. Therefore, the exible wage model
implies that cross-country di¤erences in the labor market explain cross-country di¤erences in
income per capita. Finally, when wages exhibit inertia, both the growth rate and the employ-
ment rate exhibit transition and the time path of these two variables depends on the initial
value of both capital and wages. Therefore, two economies with the same initial capital stock
and di¤erent initial wages may exhibit very di¤erent time paths of employment and growth.
7Appendix B provides a formal proof of stability.
8Wages are a state variable when wage inertia is introduced into the model. In contrast, when wages are
exible, as in Subsection 3.2, they are directly determined by the capital stock. In this case, the unique state
variable is the capital stock.
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A. Derivation of the wage equation
In this appendix we obtain the wage equation (3.1) for two di¤erent wage setting models. First,
in a monopolistic union model, where the wage is set by unions and, second, in an e¢ ciency
wage model, where the wage is set by rms.
Monopolistic union wage setting
We assume that there is a national union that chooses the wage in order to maximize the
average labor income
W = ~Ldt (wt)wt + (Nt   ~Ldt (wt))zt
where ~Ldt (wt) is the labor demand and zt is the alternative income, which, in this case, is equal
to the unemployment benet. The rst order condition for the optimal wage is
~Ldt (wt) + (wt   zt)
d~Ld(wt)
dwt
= 0,
which rewritten in terms of the elasticity of the labor demand with respect to the wage, "t;
simplies to
"t   d
~Ld(w)
dw
w
~Ld(w)
=
wt
wt   zt .
This equation can be rewritten as wt = mwzt; where mw = "t= ("t   1) is the wage mark-up.
This mark-up is constant when the labor demand elasticity is constant, which occurs when the
production function is Cobb-Douglas, Yt = Lt . In this case, the elasticity of the labor demand
is 1= (1  ), where wt = mwzt and mw = 1= .
An obvious extension is to introduce taxes on labor income. In this case, the objective
function of the union is
W = ~Ldt (wt) (1  )wt + (Nt   ~Ldt (wt))zt
and the optimal wage is given by
wt =
"t
(1  ) ("t   1)zt:
A further obvious extension is to assume that wages are bargained between unions and rms.
If we assume that the objective of the unions is to maximize the di¤erence between wages and
the reservation wage of workers, whereas the objective of rms is to maximize prots, the Nash
product is
W =
h
~Ldt (wt) (wt   zt)
i h
F (~Ld(wt))  wt ~Ld(wt)
i1 
where  measures the power of unions in the bargaining process. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas
production function, we obtain that the wage is wt = mwzt where mw =


+(1 ): Note that
the mark-up depends positively on the power of unions in the bargaining process, .
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E¢ ciency wages
We assume that the production function of the rm is Yt = F (etLt), where et is e¤ort.
We also assume that e¤ort depends on the wage according to the following e¤ort function:
et = ~e(wt); where ~e0 > 0. The problem of the rm is to choose wt and Lt in order to maximize
prots taking into account the e¤ort function. Therefore, the objective function of the rm is
(wt; Lt) = F (~e(wt)Lt)  wtLt.
The rst order conditions are
F 0(:)~e0(wt) = 1,
F 0(:)~e(wt) = wt.
From these two equations, we obtain that the optimal wage is such that the elasticity of the
e¤ort function is one, which implies that ~e0(wt)wt=~e(wt) = 1: Assuming that the e¤ort function
satises9
et =
8<:

wt zt
zt

if wt > zt
0 if wt  zt
we obtain that wt = mwzt; where mw = 11  .
B. Stability of the dynamic equilibrium
In order to prove the stability of the equilibrium when wages exhibit inertia, we obtain the
Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state from the system of di¤erential equations (2.11)
and (3.4). The second of these di¤erential equations can be rewritten as
_wt = wt

mw (1  lt)
1  lt   (1  )mw lt   1

= wtg (lt)
and, using the denition of the employment rate, we obtain
_wt = wtg

kt
~k(wt)

:
The Jacobian matrix is
J =
 
@ _k
@k
@ _k
@w
@ _w
@k
@ _w
@w
!
=
 
0 ksh0 (w)
wg0(l)
~k(w)  wg0 (l) l
~k0(w)
~k(w)
!
:
The determinant of the Jacobian matrix is
Det (J) =  sh0 (w)wg0 (l) l
9This e¤ort function can be found in Romer (2006), section 9.3.
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and the trace is
Tr (J) =  wg0 (l) l
~k0(w)
~k(w)
We have shown that h0 (w) < 0 and ~k0(w) > 0; and
g0 (l) =
mw(1  )mw
(1  lt   (1  )mw lt)2
> 0:
Using the sign of these derivatives, we obtain that the determinant is positive and the trace
is negative. As a result, the characteristic roots of the dynamic system are negative implying
that the steady state is stable. Moreover, as both wages and capital are state variables, there
is a unique equilibrium converging to this steady state, given initial conditions for both capital
and wages.
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 Figure 1. Transitional dynamics of capital in an economy with flexible wages. 
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Figure 2. Transitional dynamics of capital and wages in an economy with wage inertia.  
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